Ukraine: What the media doesn’t tell us, Part Two

Last time I looked at some of the background issues regarding Ukraine and the current war. Now I would like to look at the military situation, which is very difficult as no one seems to know what is happening, and few people are even reporting the military situation beyond a few bland statements. Much of what is happening must be guesswork, and reliant on what we know about the military strengths and weaknesses of the two sides, and the (very) limited reporting from the front lines. The media focuses more on the (important) human stories of misery to the exclusion of informing us about the military situation. This is in contrast to Western reporting of other wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and so on, where journalists are working closely with, and often embedded with, the military.

Most of what we hear about the Ukrainian and Russian military situation on the BBC and in the newspapers is based on what the Ukrainians are saying, which is inevitably biased and probably largely wrong. If we believe Western media then we should think that the Ukrainian forces are holding their own against the Russians, that their equipment is equal to the Russians’ and that they are inflicting more harm on the Russians than the Russians are inflicting on them. The truth is unknown, but the Russians are advancing, and there are a number of things we should consider, for example armour and air forces.

Before the war started the Ukrainian air force had around 225 aircraft. Of these, fewer than 100 are combat aircraft, mainly Mig-29s and Su-27s with a few Su-24s and Su-25s. These aircraft are not far from obsolete. Actually compared to some of the Russian planes they are obsolete. The better ones, the Mig-29s (which Poland is purportedly going to provide more of to the Ukrainians if they can find a way of getting them across the border without getting drawn into the war) and the Su-27s were introduced in the 1980s. They are Soviet aircraft. They have been upgraded but they are no match for the Su-35s of the Russian air force.

Since the 1930s, ground invasions have usually been preceded by air bombardment, often lasting several hours or days, designed to reduce the defences of the attacked country. This did not happen in the current war. We don’t know why, though it was perhaps thought that the Ukrainian forces would collapse quickly and the Russians wanted limited destruction so they could quickly rebuild the country. Nevertheless, there have been air battles, though these are rarely reported in the Western media, presumably because it is usually the Ukrainians that have lost planes. We saw a video of a presumably Russian helicopter shot down, and a Ukrainian pilot reputedly shot down 6 planes in one day, though this is likely to be a myth. What most media outlets did not tell us was that Russian planes (presumably) shot down four Ukrainian Su-27s in one day, while ground-based missiles shot down an Su-25, a drone and a helicopter on the same day. Military Watch magazine has a picture of several Ukrainian Mig-29s shot up while on the ground somewhere in Ukraine.

It appears that though Western media generally does not report significant Ukrainian losses, the Ukrainian air force has possibly been largely destroyed or has to confine itself to Western Ukraine. The best hope for the Ukrainians is having a good supply of Stinger ground-to-air missiles, which are highly effective at bringing down aircraft.

Turning to armour, the Ukrainian army has the largest European tank force outside Russia, perhaps 850 tanks. This substantial force should be able to meet most threats. Unfortunately most of it (around 90%) consists of outdated Soviet vehicles, particularly the T-64B, which was introduced in the 1970s. While some have been upgraded, they are no match for Russian armour. The T-72B3 and the T-90M are better armoured, have more modern firepower (rounds and ranges), and have a greater operational range.

The Russians have not yet, apparently, deployed their best tank, the T-14, which is superior to any other tank in the world, with a greater range, a gun which can accurately fire 12km, very strong armour to protect the crew – and it probably not worth employing in Ukraine given the superiority of the Russians’ other tanks.

The best hope for the Ukrainians regarding stopping Russian armour is probably hand-held anti-tank weapons that are being shipped to Ukraine from the West. Another example of asymmetrical warfare which endangers the operator.

The most significant problem the Russians might face, and we do not know the details here, may be logistical. Do they have enough fuel for their armoured columns, their resupply trucks, their aeroplanes? Do they have sufficient spare parts? How is resupply affected by the sanctions?

It remains to be seen whether the Russians can succeed in their war aims using their current approach, or whether they will need to employ their superior weaponry in greater numbers. Presumably they do not want to destroy the infrastructure of Ukraine any more than is necessary, but given the will of the Ukrainians, the desire to fight and kill the Russians, they may have bitten off more than they can chew, particularly if the West can continue to resupply the Ukrainians without being drawn into a wider war.

We should not think that the Russians are bogged down, that their advances are not going to plan. Ukraine is a big country, and it is likely to take a long time to subdue. And even if the Russians do succeed in taking over the country will it be safe for them to walk the streets at night?

Some of the above is speculation, some is known, but I would like to see more journalists in this war doing their job, which involves reporting what is happening as objectively as possible, and then conducting analysis in the same way.